CMO Council reports that 71% of internet users in the U.S. were influenced by coupons and discounts when making their purchase decisions. It has also been shown that offering coupons to a small fraction of users may affect the purchase decisions of many other users in a social network. This motivates us to study stochastic coupon probing problem in social networks. Assume there is a social network and a set of coupons. We can offer coupons to some users adaptively and those users who accept the offer will act as seeds and influence their friends in the social network. There are two constraints which are called the inner and outer constraints, respectively. The set of coupons redeemed by users must satisfy inner constraints, and the set of all probed users must satisfy outer constraints. One seeks to develop a coupon probing policy that achieves the maximum influence while satisfying both inner and outer constraints. Our main result is a constant approximation policy for the stochastic coupon probing problem for any monotone submodular utility function.
INTRODUCTION
Social media marketing has been recognized as one of the most effective marketing methods which can increase marketers' business' visibility with little cost. As reported in Social Media Examiner, around 96% of marketers are currently participating in social media marketing. Different from traditional online marketing strategy whose focus is to find the best match between a given product and an individual customer, social media marketing is more concerned about the network value of a customer. For example, giving some influential customers an incentive (such as coupon as studied in this work) to share your product information with their social circle could increase your brand recognition rapidly as they are engaging with a broad audience of customers.
To this end, we introduce and study the stochastic coupon probing problem in social networks. Assume there is a social network and a set of coupons. We can offer coupons to some users and those users who accept the offer will act as seed nodes and influence their friends in the social network. Following the basic setting of a stochastic probing problem [1] , we assume that any feasible solution must satisfy two constraints which are called the inner and outer constraints, respectively. The set of coupons redeemed by users must satisfy inner constraints, and the set of all probed users must satisfy outer constraints. In particular, we consider the following constraints in our basic model: (Outer Constraint) The number of probes involving the same user can not exceed a non-negative constant, and (Inner Constraint) the total value of redeemed coupons can not exceed a non-negative number. Our ultimate goal is to develop a coupon probing policy that achieves the maximum influence subject to both inner and outer constraints.
We notice that most of existing studies on coupon allocation assume a "budgeted and non-adaptive " setting [2] , where there is a predefined budget for selecting seed nodes, their solution is to commit the set of initial users and corresponding coupons all at once in advance. Our model is largely different from all existing work. We consider a stochastic optimization problem: Rather than make a one-shot decision at the very beginning, we can probe users one by one using some carefully selected coupons, and the decision made at each round is depending on the realization from previously probed users. In particular, if a user accepts our coupon, then we add that user to the solution and deduct corresponding coupon value from our budget, otherwise, the budget remains the same. Since the remaining budget after each round depends on the realization from earlier rounds, our decision made in each round is also dependent on the choices in earlier rounds.
Based on the above discussion, our problem falls belong to the category of stochastic optimization. Although there has been extensive work on adaptive/stochatic submodular optimization/probing [1, [3] [4] [5] [6] , our stochastic coupon probing model is substantially different from these problems: first of all, existing studies mainly assume that the cost of the action is fixed and pre-known, however, this assumption is clearly not true under our model, i.e, the actual cost of offering some coupon to a user depends on whether or not she accepts the offer; secondly, actions may incur non-uniform cost in our model, i.e., coupons have different values; thirdly, the realization of different actions are not independent, i.e., any rational user will not accept a low value coupon while rejecting a high value coupon; lastly, our model involves a broader set of constraints including outer matroid constraint and inner knapsack constraint. Unfortunately, none of the the attractiveness of to ( , ) an action that offers to ( , ) an action that offers to sequentially (( , )) the realization of action ( , ) the expected cost of action ( , ) Ψ subsequences from with size at most × Ψ the action space under P.B existing solutions in the literature explicitly take the above four constraints into account.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically study the stochastic coupon probing problem in social networks. We make use of the contention resolution scheme [7] and present a novel probing policy that achieves a constant approximation ratio. This research contributes fundamentally to the development of approximate probing policies for any problems that fall into the family of stochastic optimization problems with correlated realizations subject to outer matroid constraint and inner knapsack constraint. We conduct extensive experiments on a real dataset and the results validate the effectiveness of our solutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We review related work in Section 2 and introduce our problem formulation in Section 3. We develop a novel coupon probing policy in Section 4. In Section 5, we extend the basic model to incorporate more constraints. The experiment results are reported in Section 6. We conclude this paper in Section 7. Some important notations are listed in Table 1 .
RELATED WORK
This work is closely related to two topics: influence maximization (IM) and stochastic submodular optimization. IM has been extensively studied in the literature [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] , their objective is to find a set of influential customers so as to maximize the expected cascade. However, our work differ from all existing studies in several major aspects. Traditional IM assumes any node is guaranteed to be activated once it is selected, we relax this assumption by allowing users to response differently to different coupon values. Recently, [2, 16] study discount allocation problem in social networks. However, [2] assumes a budgeted and non-adaptive setting where decisions must be made all at once in advance, while [16] simply ignores the outer constraint, e.g., their model allows the company to probe all users at zero cost. In contrast, we formulate our problem as a stochastic optimization problem subject to both inner and other constraints.
The second topic is on adaptive/stochatic submodular optimization/probing [1, [3] [4] [5] [6] . Existing approaches can not apply directly to our setting due to the following reasons: (1) the actual cost of offering some coupon to a user is stochastic rather than a fixed value, (2) coupons have different values, (3) the realization of different actions are not independent, and (4) our problem involves a broader set of constraints including outer matroid constraint and inner knapsack constraint. In summary, we are the first to study the stochastic coupon probing problem with correlated realizations subject to outer matroid constraint and inner knapsack constraint. We build upon the recent advances in submodular maximization such as contention resolution scheme [7] , and propose a novel probing policy that provides the first bounded approximate solutions to this problem.
PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 3.1 Preliminaries

Submodular Function.
A submodular function is a set function ℎ : 2 Ω → R, where 2 Ω denotes the power set of Ω, which satisfies a natural "diminishing returns" property: the marginal gain from adding an element to a set is at least as high as the marginal gain from adding the same element to a superset of . Formally, a submodular function satisfies the follow property: For every , ⊆ Ω with ⊆ and every ∈ Ω∖ , we have that ℎ( ∪{ })−ℎ( ) ≥ ℎ( ∪{ })−ℎ( ) We say a submodular function is monotone if ℎ( ) ≤ ℎ( ) whenever ⊆ .
Continuous Extensions.
Consider any vector x = { 1, 2, . . . , } such that each 0 ≤ ≤ 1. The concave extension of ℎ is defined as
Models
Coupon Adoption Model and Influence Function:
Consider a set of users and a set of coupon values , for every coupon ∈ and every user ∈ , we define the attractiveness of to as , ∈ [0, 1]. For simplicity of presentation, we directly use to represent the value of . We assume that users are rational, meaning that they favor coupons with larger value, e.g.,
We next describe the coupon adoption model used in this work. At the beginning, every user ∈ selects a random number ∈ [0, 1], which is called threshold of . And accepts any coupon with attractiveness larger than or equal to . Once a user accepts a coupon, she becomes a seed node of our product and starts to influence other users in the social network. We denote the expected influence of a set of seed nodes as ( ), which is a monotone and submodular function of , following the seminal work on influence maximization [8] . It is easy to verify that , is equivalent to the adoption probability as defined in [2] , e.g., the probability that accepts is , .
Action Space and Realizations.
We consider an action space ℋ × , where an action ( , ) ∈ ℋ represents offering coupon ∈ to user ∈ . Define (( , )) ∈ {0, 1} to be the realization of action ( , ) ∈ ℋ:
1 if accepts and becomes the seed ( , ≥ ) 0 if rejects ( , < )
We say ( , ) is active (resp. inactive) if (( , )) = 1 (resp. (( , )) = 0). We can observe the realization of (( , )) by probing using . According to our coupon adoption model, each action ( , ) is active with probability , . However, the states of different actions are not independent, e.g., if ( , ) is active, then every ( , ′ ) with ′ ≥ must be active (any rational user will not reject a coupon with higher value).
Probing Policy.
A probing policy can be characterized as a function from realizations observed so far to ℋ, specifying which action to pick next based on our current knowledge.
where Φ denotes the collection of realizations observed so far. By following a particular policy, we sequentially pick an action ( , ) and observes its state, then decides the next action to pick, and so on. If accepts ( (( , )) = 1), we add to the set of seeds and pay , otherwise ( (( , )) = 0), we pay nothing and move to the next round.
Given a probing policy , let Pr[ | ] denote the probability that becomes the set of seed nodes by following , then the expected utility of can be represented as
Problem Formulation
We consider the setting in which we are given constraints on both users probed and the coupons redeemed by all probed users. In particular, the set of coupons redeemed by users must satisfy inner constraint, and the set of all probed users must satisfy outer constraint. In the basic model, we consider the following two constraints.
• Outer Constraints: The number of probes involving the same user can not exceed a non-negative constant . This constraint models the fact that pushing too many promotions to the same user [18] could impede her user experience.
• Inner Constraints: The total value of redeemed coupons can not exceed a non-negative number .
We present the formal definition of our problem in P.A. Our ultimate goal is to identify the best probing policy subject to both inner and outer constraints. P.A max ( ) subject to: inner constraint and outer constraint;
We develop a constant approximation coupon probing policy in Section 4. Later in Section 5, we extend the basic model to incorporate more constraints.
A Toy Example. For better understanding of our model, we next go through a toy example. In this example, we assume = {1, 2}; = { , , , , }; = 1, e.g., the same user can be probed at most once; = 3. Consider a given probing policy .
In the first round, assume (∅) = ( , 1), we offer coupon 1 to user , e.g., pick action ( , 1), and observe that rejects 1. The remaining budget is 3 and the realization is Φ1 = { ( , 1) = 0}.
In the second round, assume (Φ1) = ( , 2), we offer 2 to , e.g., pick action ( , 2), and observe that accepts 2. The remaining budget is 1 and the realization is Φ2 = { ( , 1) = 0, ( , 2) = 1}.
In the third round, assume (Φ2) = ( , 1), we offer 1 to , e.g., pick action ( , 1), and observe that accepts 1. The remaining budget is 0 and the realization is Φ3 = { ( , 1) = 0, ( , 2) = 1, ( , 1) = 1}.
At the end, = { , } is returned as the seed set and the utility is ({ , }).
STOCHASTIC COUPON PROBING POLICY
Overview. In this paragraph, we present an overview of our algorithm design. We first construct two candidate algorithms, say ALG I and ALG II, and then randomly pick one algorithm with equal probability as the final solution. Our approach is inspired by the enumeration trick used to solve knapsack problem: we partition all coupons into two groups according to their values, then apply ALG I (resp. ALG II) to find a near optimal solution using only "low-value" (resp. "high-value") coupons. Later we show that the better solution returned from the above two algorithms achieves at least a constant approximation ratio.
ALG I
Before introducing the design of ALG I, we first present a restricted version of P.A. Notice that in P.A, there is no restriction on the sequence of probed users and coupons, meaning that we can probe one user first and then come back to probe that user again, using a different coupon. To facilitate our study, we next introduce a restricted version of P.A by adding one additional outer constraint: the same user can only be probed in consecutive rounds. The restricted outer constraints is presented as follows:
• Restricted Outer Constraints: (a) the number of probes involving the same user can not exceed a non-negative constant ; (b) the same user can only be probed in consecutive rounds.
We present the formal definition of the restricted problem in P.B. P.B max ( ) subject to: restricted outer constraints and inner constraints;
Perhaps surprisingly, later we show that restricting ourselves to probe the same user in consecutive rounds does not sacrifice much in terms of the utility. This enables us to focus on solving P.B in the rest of this paper.
Since we can only probe the same user in consecutive rounds, a valid probing policy on any individual user can be characterized as a sorted list of coupons ⊆ with size at most , specifying the sequence of coupons we offer to sequentially. Assume we decide to probe using , the probing process that involves can be roughly described as follows: We follow to offer a coupon ∈ to one by one. If accepts , we deduct from the budget and stop. Otherwise, if turns down , we simply move to the next coupon in , the budget of the next round remains unchanged. This process iterates until either accepts the current coupon or rejects the entire . Let = { ∈ | ≤ /2} be the low-value coupons in . The input of ALG I is , restricting ourselves to use lowvalue coupons only. Notice that there is no point offering a larger coupon to a user before offering her a smaller coupon. Therefore, we sort in non-decreasing order of their values, e.g., ∀ ≤ , ≤ . Define
where ≺ represents that is a subsequence of . Since is a constant, the size of Ψ is polynomial in the size of . We next define the action space under P.B:
× Ψ
Picking an action ( , ) ∈ translates to probing user using sequence . Define as the probability that becomes a seed after picking ( , ):
= max ∈ , . Now we are ready to describe ALG I. The general idea is to first find a fractional solution with a bounded approximation ratio and then round it to an integral solution.
We present P.B-r, a relaxed version of P.B, as follows.
P.B-r: Maximize + (q · y) subject to:
In the above formulation,
• y is a | | × |Ψ| decision matrix.
is the set of all users involved in .
• is the expected cost of action ( , ):
where , 0 = 0.
Algorithm 1 Continuous Greedy
Let ℛ( ) be a random set which contains each ( , ) independent with probability ( ).
4:
For each ( , ) ∈ , estimate
Solve the following liner programming problem and obtain the optimal solution y 6:
Let ( + ) = ( ) + ;
8:
Increment = + ;
We use the continuous greedy algorithm (Algorithm 1) to solve P.B-r and obtain an fractional solution y . This algorithm is first proposed in [19] in the context of offline submodular function maximization. Notice that condition ( 2.1) (resp. ( 1.1)) is replaced by ∑︀ ( , )∈ ≤ (resp. ∀ ∈ : ∑︀ ∈Ψ ≤ ) in P.C, where 0 ≤ ≤ 1/2 is a tuning parameter, e.g., we follow the idea of contention resolution scheme [7] to scale down the budgets by a factor of .
Given y , we next introduce the design of ALG I.
Step 1: Let ℛ be a random set obtained by including each element ( , ) independently with probability .
Step 2: Apply Contention resolution [7] to ℛ to obtain a new set such that | ∩ | ≤ 1 where contains all actions from that involves .
Step 3: Consider actions from one by one in an arbitrary order, let the current action, say ( , ), survive if the current budget is no smaller than /2, else we discard it.
• If ( , ) survives, probe using .
-If rejects the entire , repeat Step 3 with the same budget. -Otherwise, if accepts some coupon ∈ , deduct from the current budget and repeat Step 3. • If ( , ) is discarded, repeat Step 3 with the same budget.
Step 4: We add all survived actions to 1. Let y + be the optimal solution to P.B-r, we next prove that ALG I is feasible and its expected cascade E[ ( 1)] is close to + (q · y + ). 
Proof. We first prove the feasibility of ALG I. First of all, we always choose some action from to probe, thus every user receives at most coupons (outer constraint is satisfied). In Step 3, we probe a user if and only if the current budget is no smaller than /2, the inner constraint is also satisfied since we only consider low-value coupons.
Fix some ( , ) ∈ . After Step 2, ( , ) survives with probability 1− − [Corollary 4.8 in [7] ]. Now we consider the survival rate of ( , ) after the Step 3. Let 1 denote the event that the total value of the coupons redeemed by ∖ { } is no larger than /2. Since every coupon in has value no larger than /2, ( , ) will be probed if 1 happens. Because the expected cost of our solution is bounded by ∑︀ ( , )∈
≤
, then according to Markov's inequality, the probability of 1 is bounded by Pr
The first inequality is due to a modified version of Theorem 1.3 in [7] . Since the actual cost of offering to a user could be any value from , we define the state of each action as follows: (( , )) = if ( , ) has been picked in Step 1 and accepts ∈ ( could be zero), otherwise if ( , ) is not picked, (( , )) = −1. By defining ⊆ ′ if is (pairwise) smaller than or equal to ′ , the above two contention resolution schemes (Step 2 and Step 3 ) are still monotone. Thus we can still use FKG inequality to prove Theorem 1.3 for our model. The second inequality is due to (q·y ) ≥ (1−1/ ) + (q·y + ) which is proved in [20] .
ALG II
In ALG II, we only use the largest coupon max = arg max ∈ . Given that we can only use one type of coupon, the coupon probing problem is reduced to determining the best order of users in which to probe them. To avoid trivial cases, we assume max > /2, otherwise ALG I already achieves a constant approximation ratio.
The design of ALG II follows a simple greedy manner. We sort all users in non-increasing order of ({ }), then probe them one by one using max. This process terminates when the current user accepts max or the last user rejects max. Let denote all users placed before , we have Lemma 4.2. ALG II is the optimal policy if we are only allowed to use the largest coupon max, and the expected utility of ALG II is
Put It All Together
We randomly choose one algorithm from ALG I and ALG II with equal probability as our solution. We refer to this algorithm as Stochastic Coupon Probing policy (stoch-CP). The rest of this paper is devoted to proving Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.3. Given any 0 ≤ ≤ 1/2, stoch-CP achieves
Proof. Let P.A be a low-value version of P.A, restricting ourselves to using low-value coupons only. Let * be the optimal solution to P.A. We next show by construction that there exists a policy ◇ that is feasible to P.A and its performance is close to * . Given * , we next explain how to build ◇ on * . Note that our purpose is not to really construct such ◇ (this turns out to be impossible since * is not known in advance), instead, we only want to prove the existence of such a policy.
Let Φ be the set of realizations available at round (starting with Φ0 = ∅). Assume * is known and * (Φ ) = ( * , * ), e.g., * picks ( * , * ) as the next action conditioned on Φ , the new policy ◇ (Φ ) is defined as follows:
After observing ( ◇ (Φ )), we update the realizations from Φ to Φ +1 as follows:
• Case A: If * ≤ /2, add (( * , * )) to Φ : Φ +1 = Φ ∪ (( * , * )). • Case B: If * > /2, then ◇ is not allowed to use * , thus it is impossible to observe the value of (( * , * )).
To overcome this difficulty, we guess the value of (( * , * )) using simulation as follows: Assume < 1/2 is the largest low-value coupon offered to * by ◇ so far, randomly select a threshold ∈ ( * , , 1]. This value is fixed once it has been selected and it will be used as * 's threshold in the subsequent rounds.
-If * , * ≥ , add (( * , * )) = 1 to Φ +1 virtually -If * , * < , we add (( * , * )) = 0 to Φ +1 virtually. We use Φ to denote the realizations obtained at the final round. We define Φ to be the seed set added to Φ . Note that ◇ mimics the execution of * , thus
However, Φ is not the actual set of seeds obtained by ◇ , this is because under Case B, we may virtually add some (( ′ , ′ )) = 1 with ′ > /2 to Φ . Fortunately, we add at most one such action to Φ , otherwise it violates the budget constraint. It follows that the actual seed set obtained by
Equations (2) and (3) imply that
To prove Theorem 4.3, it is sufficient to show that
and
.
Proof. Let * be the optimal solution to P.A . Fix some ∈ . Consider a realization that involves ∖ { }, we assume is the longest possible sequence of coupons offered to by * (not necessarily to be in consecutive rounds) given , e.g., this can only happen when the entire is rejected by . It is important to note that when * and are given, is also fixed, and we call the probing sequence offered to by * under . Let Φ denote the set of all realizations that involves ∖ { } under which is offered to by * . For every ( , ) ∈ , we define * as the probability that is offered to by * , e.g., * = ∑︀ ∈Φ Pr[ ]. We first prove that y * is a feasible solution to P.B. Because * is a feasible policy, the following conditions are satisfied in each round (1) Every user is probed using at most coupons. The above two properties ensure that y * is a feasible solution to P.B-r. Since y + is the optimal solution to P.B-r, we have + (q · y + ) ≥ + (q · y * ) ≥ ( * ). Because * is the optimal solution to P.A , we have ( * ) ≥ ( ◇ ). It follows that + (q · y + ) ≥ ( ◇ ). Then we have
The first inequality is due to Lemma 4.1 and the second inequality is due to + (q · y + ) ≥ ( ◇ ).
Proof. Because is submodular, we have
According to ALG II, 2 contains a single active user which gives the largest expected influence, then we have
This finishes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
EXTENSION: INCORPORATING COUPON DISTRIBUTION BUDGET
We now study P.A1, an extension of P.A, by adding one more constraint to P.A: the number of users that are probed can not exceed an non-negative number . This constraint captures the fact that the company often has limited budget on coupon producing and distribution, thus we can offer coupons to a limited number of users. We next summarize the updated constraints as follows.
• Outer Constraints: The number of probes involving the same user can not exceed a non-negative number and the number of users probed can not exceed an non-negative number .
Extended ALG I
We present P.B-r1, an extended version of P.B-r, as follows. Condition ( 4.1) specifies the additional outer constraint.
Similar to ALG I, the basic idea of Extended ALG I (E-ALG I) is still to use the continuous greedy algorithm to obtain a fractional solution first, then round it to an integer solution. The continuous greedy algorithm is basically the same as Algorithm 1, except in that P.C is replaced by P.C1.
Let y be the solution returned from the continuous greedy algorithm, we next round y to an integer solution. Our rounding approach is the same as the one used in ALG I except in that Step 2 is replaced by the following procedure.
Modified
Step 2: Apply contention resolution for two matroids to ℛ to obtain a new set such that | ∩ | ≤ 1 and | | ≤ . Let 2 be the set of survived actions, we next prove that E-ALG I is feasible and its expected cascade E[ ( 2)] is close to the optimal solution.
Lemma 5.1. E-ALG I is feasible and Proof. We first prove the feasibility of E-ALG I. First of all, because | ∩ | ≤ 1 and | | ≤ , satisfies the outer constraints. In Step 3, we probe a group of users subject to budget constraint, thus inner constraint is also satisfied.
Fix some ( , ) ∈ . After Modified Step 2, ( , ) survives with probability ( 1− − ) 2 . Similar to Lemma 4.1, we can prove that the survival rate of ( , ) after Step 3 is 1 − 2 . Then according to [7] , we have
Extended ALG II
Similar to ALG II, we only use max in Extended ALG II (E-ALG II). However, instead of using a simple greedy algorithm to find the optimal solution, we turn to dynamic programming to handle the additional constraint ( 4.1). Notice that since we can only probe users, our problem becomes a joint user selection and sequencing problem, e.g., select a set of users and decide in what order to probe them using max.
Assume all users are sorted in non-decreasing order of ({ }). In the following recurrence, [ , ] stores the optimum expected utility that can be obtained from users , · · · , subject to the constraint that we can only probe users. Essentially, we need to decide whether to probe or not in each step. The optimal value gained from adding to the solution can be calculated as
Otherwise, the optimal value is [ − 1, ]. Thus we adopt the following recurrence to obtain a sequence of users [ , ]:
Then we probe [ , ] one by one in non-increasing order of ({ }) until some user accepts max or none of them accepts max. Let 2 denote the set of seeds returned from E-ALG II.
Put It All Together
We randomly choose one algorithm from E-ALG I and E-ALG II with equal probability as our solution. We refer to this algorithm as Extended Stochastic Coupon Probing policy (Estoch-CP). The rest of this paper is devoted to proving Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.2. Given any 0 ≤ ≤ 1/2, E-stoch-CP achieves
Proof. Let E-P.A be a low-value version of E-P.A, restricting ourselves to using low-value coupons only. Let * be the optimal solution to E-P.A. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3, we can show that there exists a policy ◇ that is feasible to E-P.A and
To prove Theorem 5.2, it is sufficient to prove the following two lemmas.
The proof of Lemma 5.3 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.4, thus omitted here.
Proof. Since ′ denotes the user (if any) who accepts some coupon larger than /2 and we can add at most one such user to the optimal solution, one can obtain a valid upper bound of [∆ Φ ∖{ ′ } ( ′ )| ◇ ], e.g., the marginal contribution of ′ to the optimal policy, by computing ( ℎ ) where ℎ is the optimal solution when restricting ourselves to using highvalue coupons ∖ . It was worth noticing that those users who accept a low-value coupon under * will not contribute to [∆ Φ ∖{ ′ } ( ′ )| ◇ ]. However, if a user, say , rejects all low-value coupons offered by * , we need to update the distribution of as follows: assumeˆis the largest low-value coupon rejected by , then the conditional value of is to be randomly selected from ( ,^, 1]. Under either of the previous two cases, the conditional value of [∆ Φ ∖{ ′ } ( ′ )| ◇ ] is only decreased. This observation indicates that ( ℎ ) is still a valid upper bound of [∆ Φ ∖{ ′ } ( ′ )| ◇ ], conditioned on some low-value coupons have been offered to the users.
Next we prove that [ ( 2)] ≥ ( ℎ ). We first prove that there exists a ℎ that probes the same user in consecutive rounds. Consider a relaxed problem where the set of users probed by ℎ is known, it is optimal to probe in nonincreasing order of ({ }). This is because if there exists two users , ∈ : ({ }) < ({ }) and is probed first, we lose the chance to probe if accepts the coupon, thus probing first leads to a larger expected utility. Therefore, it is optimal to probe the same user in consecutive rounds. It follows that the expected utility of ℎ is
where denotes the set of users that are probed before , e.g., ∀ ∈ : ({ }) ≤ ({ }), and ℎ denotes the largest coupon offered to by ℎ . Consider a fixed , we next show that ∑︀
is a increasing function of , ℎ for any ∈ (assuming , ℎ is fixed for all other ∈ ∖ { }. This is because ∑︀ 
In the above equation, 1 is the expected utility conditioned on is probed and accepts the coupon and 2 is the expected utility conditioned on is probed and rejects the coupon. Since the first term of Eq. (6) does not contain , ℎ , we next focus on proving that the second term of Eq. (6) is a increasing function of , ℎ . Because 1 = ({ }) and all users probed after has expected utility no larger than ({ }), we have 1 ≥ 2. It follows that the second term of Eq. (6) is an increasing function of , ℎ , thus
is an increasing function of , ℎ . Therefore, offering max to each user will never decrease the expected utility. Since ( 2) is the optimal solution when using max only, we have
This finishes the proof of Theorem 5.2.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The goal of our experiments is multifold. First, we would like to evaluate the performance of the proposed coupon probing policy in terms of the expected utility yielded by our policy under varying budget . Second, we evaluate the influence of outer constraint , the number of probes involving the same user, on the quality of the solutions by measuring the expected utility achieved by our policy under different parameter settings. Finally, we evaluate how the other outer constraint , the number of users probed, affects the performance of our policy compared with a group of baselines. Datasets. We conduct extensive experiments on NetHEP-T [21] to examine the performance of the proposed policy.
Propagation Model. The influence propagation model governs the way that information spreads in the social network. In this work, we adopt the standard Independence Cascade model, which is widely used in the literature [8] . For IC model, we set the influence probability for each directed edge ( , ) as follow: ( , ) = 1 , where denotes the in-degree of . This setting is widely adopted in prior work [2, 16] . Adoption Model. As we discussed in Section 3.2, we use , ∈ [0, 1] to denote the attractiveness of coupon ∈ [0, 1] to user . User accepts any coupon with attractiveness , greater than or equal to , the threshold of . Given a network = ( , ℰ), we randomly select 85% nodes to assign
, and 10% nodes to assign , = , and 5% nodes to assign , = 2 as their attractiveness functions.
Algorithms. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed coupon probing policy, we compare E-stoch-CP with the following two baseline algorithms.
• Myopic. It selects a node with the largest marginal increment of the expected utility in each iteration, probe the node with available coupon values in increasing order, until budget ( ) is exhausted or the number of users probed ( ) is violated, whichever comes first. Given , the outer constraint on the number of probes involving same user, this algorithm probes each selected node with coupon values between 0 and 1 in steps of 1 . This algorithm only considers social influence but ignores the attractiveness distribution. • Random. It randomly picks an action in each iteration, until is exhausted or is violated, whichever comes first.
We implement an instantiation of each algorithm with the RR-set sampling technique [22] for efficient influence spread estimation. All experiments are repeated for 100 rounds and the average results are reported in the following.
Results. Experimental results are reported on the metric measured by the expected utility yielded by each algorithm on various datasets. Figure 1 shows the expected utility yielded by different algorithms on NetHEPT. Specifically, Figure 1 (a) plots the expected utility yielded when the budget ranges from 10 to 80. The -axis holds the value of and the -axis holds the expected utility. As shown in the figure, the expected utility grows as increases, since a larger increases the the number of seed nodes, leading to more active nodes at the end of the diffusion process. We also observe that E-stoch-CP outperforms both baselines for any tested, and the gap between E-stoch-CP and the baselines becomes larger as increases. Random performs poorly as it randomly selects node-coupon pairs without considering social influence. As a result, considerable portion of budget is wasted on probing inferior nodes or probing with insufficient coupon values. Myopic fails to find good solutions since it only considers the influence diffusion but the adoption distribution is not examined during seed selection. In each iteration, Myopic selects a seed node that leads to the largest marginal increment of the influence spread based on current realization. Therefore, it tends to invest the budget on a group of highly influential nodes as the seed set. In contrast, E-stoch-CP obtains a better solution by taking advantage of the power of realization and examining the dependency of attractiveness among different coupon values. Therefore, it makes better decisions on budget investment when selecting nodes to probe, leading to a comprehensive solution set as a result. Figure 1 (b)-(c) manifests that E-stoch-CP outperforms the baselines under various and . Specifically, the expected utility produced by each algorithm increases as and increases, respectively. The underlying reason is that a larger enables a node to be probed with higher coupon values, leading to higher probability of accepting the coupon and becoming a seed. A larger indicates more nodes being probed and ending up active at the end of the diffusion process.
In summary, our experiments on real benchmark social networks show that the proposed coupon probing policy is effective, producing far superior solutions than the baseline algorithms.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we study stochastic coupon probing problem in social networks. Different from existing work on discount allocation, we formulate our problem as a stochastic optimization problem. Our ultimate goal is to develop an efficient probing policy subject to inner and outer constraints. We notice that existing stochastic optimization approaches can not apply to our setting directly. Our main result is a constant approximation policy for the stochastic coupon probing problem, and we believe that this result made fundamental contributions to the field of stochastic optimization. We also conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of our policy, the experiment results validate the effectiveness of our approach.
